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Though there's great disagreement over its costs and bene¯ts, \globalization" em-
bodies the notion of change|greater ¯nancial integration, reductions in barriers to
trade and increases in the exchange of information are expected to lead to changes
in income, prices, patterns of employment, and so on. Broadly speaking, proponents
of these changes tend to focus on the value of improvements in aggregate quanti-
ties, such as GDP predicted by theory, while opponents fear increases in inequality
both within and across countries, and tend to disparage the bene¯ts associated with
exposing poor households to the \discipline" of free, competitive markets.
These latter concerns have to do with the risks households bear. Even if one
accepts the argument that aggregate measures of income will increase, if a second
consequence of globalization is increased uncertainty then risk-averse households may
resist globalization's onslaught; poor households in particular may be greatly harmed
by increases in variation in income and expenditures.
Closely related to the issue of what risks households bear is the issue of what risks
they share. Indirect evidence of risk-sharing can be had by examining the extent to
which households' consumptions co-move. In this paper we don't have household-level
data to exploit. Instead our basic data has to do with the aggregate consumption of
households within a given consumption quintile within a given country, or what we'll
term a \country-quintile." Using a panel of such observations on ¯ve quintiles in 53
countries over 50 years, we infer the aggregate risk borne by the households within a
country-quintile risk by ¯rst measuring the shocks experienced by these households,
and then using the empirical distribution of these shocks to estimate risk. What is
a shock? For our present purposes, we infer that a shock has occurred when we see
deviations from trend in country-quintile consumption growth, where the trend in
consumption growth is estimated separately for each quintile.2
We distinguish among three di®erent categories of shocks to consumption. First
among these are global shocks. These can be inferred by measuring the common com-
ponent of changes in consumption growth across all country-quintiles. Though we
don't attempt to identify the cause of any particular shocks in this paper, instances
of shocks which have a global e®ect might include technological changes; changes in
global temperature or precipitation; major wars; or changes in U.S. monetary pol-
icy. The second category of shocks we consider are country-speci¯c shocks. These
are shocks which have a common e®ect on consumption growth for all the country-
quintiles within a given country. Examples of country-speci¯c shocks might include
changes in national policies; regional wars or civil insurrection; unusual weather pat-
terns; or a currency crisis.
The third category of shocks we consider we'll term globalization shocks. These
are shocks which e®ect households in di®erent consumption quintiles di®erently, but
which are nonetheless shared across countries, like global shocks. Thus globalization
shocks allow us to measure the extent to which the fortunes of, e.g., poor households
are linked across national boundaries. Examples of globalization shocks might include
things like skill-biased technological change, which might have di®erential e®ects on
wages and consumption growth across di®erent parts of the consumption distribution;
or alternatively more or less local shocks when markets for credit or insurance are
segmented by wealth, rather than by location. We employ the term \globalization
shock" rather than, say, `distributional shock' or `quintile-speci¯c shock' because we
wish to emphasize the point that such shocks a®ect the distribution of consumption
within countries, but do so globally, since the distribution of consumption within
each country changes in similar ways across all countries. A prerequisite for any
shock to have a common e®ect on a given consumption quintile across all countries
consumption across countries is that there be some kind of economic linkages of
households within a quintile across countries.3
Our aim in this paper is to show how changes over time in generalized Lorenz curves
(or the inverse consumption distribution) for expenditures can be used to estimate
the welfare costs associated with risk. We then use data on such Lorenz curves to
actually estimate a lower bound on these costs in selected countries where adequate
data are available. We're able to show how risk is borne across expenditure quantiles,
and so are able to indicate what share of risk is borne by poor households, and to
estimate the \globalization risk" which may a®ect di®erently situated households
across national boundaries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we ¯rst sum-
marize the predictions of theory for household-level consumption when markets are
complete and households have time-separable preferences exhibiting constant relative
risk aversion. We provide a precise de¯nition of risk used in this paper; the measure
we provide is cardinal, and is consistent with the ordinal approach taken by Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1970). We next provide methods to estimate the risk borne by
households within a particular consumption quintile, and show that this measure can
be easily decomposed into risk from various sources. Section 3 describes the data on
consumption and inequality we employ, while Section 4 reports the results of apply-
ing the methods described in Section 2 to the data described in Section 3. Section 5
concludes.
2. Methods
2.1. Consumption with Complete Markets. Consider a population of house-
holds indexed by i = 1;2;:::;n, and denote household i's realized consumption (per






log(c) if ° = 1
c1¡°¡1
1¡° otherwise.4
Here the parameter ° has the interpretation of being equal to the household's relative
risk aversion (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964).
We assume that the household may be subject to shocks which a®ect the resources
it has available at any particular date. Remarkably, so long as ° > 0 and markets
are complete, it's straightforward to show that the household's consumption won't
depend on these shocks, beyond the e®ects of these shocks on the aggregate resources
available to all households. In particular, household i's realized consumption at date t
can be written as the product of a ¯xed household factor ¸i and an aggregate quantity
¹t which may vary over both dates and (aggregate) states, but which is common to
all households, so that when markets are complete we have
(1) cit = ¸i¹t
(Wilson, 1968). Importantly for the exercise of this paper, a similar relationship holds
for any subset of households (say, all the households within a particular country). In








so that, for example, complete markets implies that aggregate consumption for the
population of any entire country will depend only global shocks which have an equal
e®ect on the populations of all nations.1
Of course, the notion of complete markets is a hypothesis, not a statement of fact,
and happens to be a hypothesis which has been rejected in a variety of (though not
all) environments.2 Still, it seems to be true that income is much more variable than
consumption in most environments, and regardless of the level of aggregation. This
suggests, as Mace (1991) observes, that the predictions of the complete markets model
are the appropriate \benchmark" for research on risk.
2.2. Predicting Consumption. Following Mace's suggestion, we proceed by ini-
tially adopting the hypothesis of global complete markets, so that every households'5
consumption varies over time only in response to truly global shocks. In particular,
let ^ c0
it be the consumption predicted by a model with global complete markets. Then
by taking the logarithm of both sides of (1), we obtain




it = ®i + ´t + ²
0
it;
where ®i = log¸i is a variable related to household wealth (unchanging because
perfectly insured) and ´t = log¹t is a measure of the global resources available at
t. With household panel data we could estimate the latent variables ®i and ´t; any
systematic deviation from the predictions of the global complete markets model would
show up in the residuals ²0
it.
As an example of the kind of deviation we might expect, suppose that markets for
risk were complete within countries, but not across them. Then we would expect the
residuals ²0
it to re°ect this, exhibiting a high correlation across households within a
country, but zero correlation across countries. A simple way to test this would be to
add an additional set of latent variables to the estimating equation (2). In particular,
let the set of countries be indexed by ` = 1;2;:::;C, with `i denoting the index of the
country in which household i is resident. Let ^ c1
it be the consumption predicted when







and (using notation analogous to that above)









with the additional restriction that
PC
c=1 ´c
t = 0. Estimating this regression would
give us a simple test of the hypothesis of complete global risk markets|if the latent
variables f´`
tg are jointly signi¯cant, then we can reject the null hypothesis of complete
global risk markets. If some risk is shared at the global level, then estimates of ´t
will be signi¯cant, and an analysis of the variance accounted for by the global and6
country-speci¯c latent variables will provide a measure of the importance of global
versus country-level risk sharing.
For our present exercise there's nothing particularly special about grouping house-
holds into countries|any grouping based on some observed ¯xed characteristics could
also serve to construct tests of risk sharing. For example, one could extend the argu-
ment above to test country-level risk sharing by adding latent variables to capture, say,
province-level shocks, or add indicators based on initial landholdings as in Townsend
(1994), initial wealth as in Jalan and Ravallion (1996), or network membership as
in Dercon and de Weerdt (2004). However, we lack household-level panel data, and
so these options are foreclosed. One question of interest for us revolves around the
amount of risk borne by households of di®erent wealth levels, but if risk sharing is
imperfect then these wealth levels will change over time, and we won't be able to
track how they change.
We proceed as follows. First, we let q index consumption quintiles, and let (`i;qit)
denote the country and consumption quintile containing household i at time t (so that,
e.g., if household i is in the bottom consumption quintile of country 2 at time t, then
(`i;qit) = (2;1)). Adopt the null hypothesis that there's perfect risk sharing within
each country, but not necessarily across countries. As a consequence, households
won't move across quintiles within a country, and so initial quintile membership
is a ¯xed characteristic under the null hypothesis.3 Let Qq = fijqi0 = qg denote
the collection of sets of country-quintile household indices at time zero. Using the
















(`;q) + ´t + ´
`
t + ¹ ²
1
(`;q)t:7
Here the terms f®(`;q)g are country-quintile \¯xed e®ects," and capture variation in
the expected level of log consumption across countries and quintiles, but not across
time. The terms f´tg capture the average impact of common (and hence \global"
in our terminology) shocks on all country-quintiles, while the terms f´`
tg capture
country-level variation over time in the log consumption of quintiles within the coun-
try.
2.3. Tests for `Globalization'. One encounters claims in the globalization litera-
ture of the form: `Globalization [however de¯ned] is responsible for increasing/decreasing
poverty/inequality.'4 Regardless of the direction of the supposed e®ect, any of these
claims seems to involve there being some correlation in household level consumption
within a given consumption quantile across countries. With the foregoing, we have
available a simple test. The question is whether or not a household's position in
the consumption distribution has any power to explain consumption outcomes for
that household after controlling for global and country-level shocks. This question
suggests the estimating equation
(3) log ¹ c
(`;q)
t = ®









tg is a collection of latent variables which captures the e®ects of shocks
which a®ect, e.g., all poor households across the entire globe. If these are collectively
signi¯cant, then we have evidence of global shocks which are speci¯c in their e®ect
on households of di®ering wealth levels. If the apparent magnitude of these shocks
is increasing over time, then we may regard this as a measure of the progress of one
sort of globalization.
2.4. De¯ning Risk. We take a utilitarian approach to de¯ning a measure of the
risk households face in any given period. As before we suppose there to be a ¯nite
population of households indexed by i = 1;2;:::;n. Following Ligon (2004) and
Ligon and Schechter (2003) we de¯ne the risk faced by the household at t by the8
function
Rit = U(Ecit) ¡ EU(cit):
Taking expectations of a concave utility function has the e®ect of making risk de-
pend not only on the mean of a household's consumption, but also on variation in
consumption.
The measure Rit, which measures the risk faced by household i, is consistent with
the ordinal measures of risk proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Further,
this risk measure can usefully be further decomposed into distinct measures of risk
corresponding to di®erent sources. For example, let E(citj¹t) denote the expected
value of consumption cit conditioned on knowledge of the aggregate global shock ¹t.
Then we can rewrite the risk facing household i as
Rit = [U(Ecit) ¡ EU(E(citj¹t))] + [EU(E(citj¹t)) ¡ EU(cit)]:
Here the ¯rst term expresses the global risk facing the household, while the second
¯lters out the global component of risk to leave an unexplained component of risk
borne by the household.5
An obvious next step follows our discussion in Section 2.2 to extend this decompo-
sition to obtain measures of the risk due to country-level shocks, and to global shocks
peculiar to di®erent parts of the wealth distribution. Let ¹`
t denote the shocks which
a®ect country ` at date t, and let ºk
t denote the globalization shocks which a®ect
quintile k (across countries) in year t. Then we have
(4) Rit = [U(Ecit) ¡ EU(E(citj¹t))]














t ))] ¡ EU(cit)]:9
The ¯rst line of this expression gives us an estimate of global risk, the second line an
estimate of country risk, the third an estimate of what we'll call \globalization risk",
and the ¯nal term remaining risk.
2.5. Estimating Risk. Now, to operationalize our measure of risk we need to devise
an estimator of the conditional expectations operators E(citj¢) which appear in (4).
For this we turn to the estimators described in Section 2.2; using least squares to
estimate the regressions suggested there gives us predictions of the value of the log
of country-quintile level consumptions. However, these equations are estimated with
error, so to construct predictions on the level of consumption expenditures we also
need to characterize the distribution of the errors of these regressions.
To estimate these conditional expectations using household level data, we would
proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the innermost conditional expectations.
Let Zit(k) be a matrix of variables pertaining to household i in an information set zt
k,
with zt
k monotonically increasing in both k and t (in the sense that zt
k µ zt0
k0 whenever
k0 ¸ k and t0 ¸ t). Then, using least squares, we estimate a sequence of parameters
f±kg from
logcit = Zit(k)±k + vit(k);
k = 1;:::;K where vit(k) are disturbances associated with the kth estimating equa-
tion; note that these will include the negative of the logarithm of any multiplicative
measurement error associated with cit. Letting ^ ±k denote the estimated parameters
from the kth regression, and ^ vit(k) the residuals, it follows that










via a second regression, again using least
squares,
(5) e
^ vit(k) = Zit(k)Ák + wit(k);10
thus constructing an estimate of the inner conditional expectations of cit
(6) ^ c
(k)
it = exp(Zit(k)^ ±k)Zit(k)^ Ák;
where ^ Ák denotes the least square estimates of Ák in (5).6
Now, of course we don't have household level data. But note that if households
within some subgroup (such as country-quintiles) have perfect within group risk shar-
ing, then a similar set of restrictions will be satis¯ed. If, however, risk sharing within
this group isn't perfect, then risk not explained by the group level variables will ap-
pear in the ¯nal \remainder" term of the risk decomposition. Our approach here is
simply to ignore this ¯nal term (as we must given our aggregate data), but to remem-
ber that households are likely to bear additional risk beyond that we can account for
using our aggregate data.
3. Data
We construct an unbalanced panel dataset comprising data on consumption expen-
ditures, where the unit of observation is a quintile-country-year. To construct this
panel we use data from two sources.
The ¯rst is the \World Income Inequality Dataset" (henceforth \WIID" UNU/WIDER,
2005), which (despite its name) contains data on the distribution of consumption ex-
penditures for a variety of countries and years. The WIID is itself descended from a
dataset compiled and described by Deininger and Squire (1996), who use the data to
explore the connection between income growth and inequality. We are unfortunately
not able to use more than a fraction of the available WIID data. The WIID is a
compilation of data from many di®erent household level surveys. We ¯rst restrict
our attention to data drawn from surveys that sampled the entire population of the
country, without any ex ante restrictions on geographical coverage, or on the age
or other demographic characteristics of the respondents. Much of the database con-
sists of data on the distribution of income rather than consumption, though it's the
latter that matters for household welfare (and the distinction between the two is of11
particular importance when considering risk, since a household with highly variable
income may nonetheless have very smooth consumption). We further limit the data
we employ by using only data for which the WIID records either quintiles or deciles of
consumption expenditures. Data recorded in deciles is aggregated up to quintiles, to
give us consistent units of observation. Finally, because our methods require looking
at changes in the distribution of consumption, we limit ourselves to using data for
countries which have expenditure surveys in at least two di®erent years.
The WIID reports only shares of expenditures, and not levels. Because we want
to be able to track changes in the levels of expenditures over time, we augment
the WIID data with data on aggregate consumption from version 6.1 of the Penn
World Tables (henceforth \PWT") (Summers and Heston, 1991). To construct our
aggregate measure of consumption we use the data on chain-weighted GDP per adult-
equivalent multiplied by the consumption share (variables labelled \RGDPEQA" and
\CC" in the PWT), so that all consumption data is expressed in terms of 1996 US
dollars. It's worth noting that the estimates of consumption's share reported in the
PWT are constructed from aggregate national income and product accounts, and that
estimates of consumption so constructed are likely to vary from estimates derived from
household-level data. Though the latter sort of estimates might be better suited to
the present study, we know of no reason to think that di®erences between the two
will be related to risk, and so use the PWT estimates without further apology.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Though the WIID includes data satisfying our criteria for Algeria in 1988 and 1995
and for Cambodia in 1994, the PWT doesn't have data on the variable RGDPEQA
for these countries in these years. Rather than dropping these countries from our
analysis, we use data from the PWT on real per capita GDP (RGDPCH), adjusting
for the di®erence between adult equivalents and per capita measures of GDP by
assuming that the ratio between RGDPEQA and RGDPCH data is unchanging over
time for each country.12
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Finally, after correcting some obvious minor errors in the WIID data (inconsistent
units for shares and missing single quintiles for some country-years), we are left with
more-or-less consistent data for 53 countries over varying periods. This is not a
random sample of countries|the WIID is much more likely to report income (rather
than expenditure) data for wealthy countries, and so the bulk of our countries are
relatively poor. These countries and the years for which we have usable data are
reported in Table 1, while Figure 2 presents a histogram which reveals the distribution
of the number of surveys per country in the usable sample.
4. Results
In this section we follow the pattern laid down by Section 2, and turn our attention
¯rst to results having to do with the prediction of consumption expenditures, and
then subsequently to the characterization of risk.
We implement a version of an estimator for the estimating equation (3). We draw
upon the experience of Ligon and Schechter (2004), who ¯nd that estimating equations
of this form using household level panel data can lead to very severe biases if the
consumption process is in fact non-stationary. We adopt the weaker assumption that




t = ¢¹ Á




t + ¢¹ ²
2
(`;q)t:
with various combinations of the right hand variables.
Here the latent variables ¢¹ Áq capture the common trends in consumption growth
shared within each world consumption quintile|thus, if the poorest twenty per cent
of households in each country in the sample have growth rates of consumption which
are signi¯cantly di®erent from the richest twenty per cent, that should be evident13
from estimates of f¢Áq(1)g in the regression
¢log ¹ c
(`;q)
t = ¢¹ Á
q(1) + ¢¹ ²(`;q)t(1):
Table 2 reports results from this regression for our sample. The ¯rst row of this
table simply gives estimates of the average growth rate for each of the world quintiles
(20%;60%;80%;100%). These are all positive, and average 2.6% across quintiles.
The most interesting pattern is that growth rates fall with wealth|while the poorest
quintile has an average growth rate of 4.3%, the wealthiest has an average growth rate
of only 1.5%, signi¯cantly less than the growth rate of the poorest quintiles. This
is the kind of evidence relied upon by Sala-i-Martin (2002) when he advances the
claim that global economic growth has reduced poverty. Our result is consistent with
this claim, albeit for a rather di®erent sample. The fact that the poorest households
within each country experience the highest rates of growth suggests that (averaged
across countries) inequality will fall over time.
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 3 presents results akin to a traditional analysis of variance exercise. The
row labeled \World Quintile" reports the proportion of variation in country-quintile
consumption growth over time which can be explained simply by a set of 5 dummy
variables indicating the (within-country) consumption quintile into which these ob-
servations fall. The ¯rst column shows the proportion of variance in consumption
growth which can be explained by di®erent sets of latent variables, each group in
isolation. Thus, the ¯rst entry of the table is equal to the R2 statistic of the regres-
sion the results of which are reported in Table 2. It's worth noting that though that
table reveals that there are no signi¯cant di®erences in average consumption growth
by global quintile, the proportion of variance explained by these factors is only 0.5
per cent, far from signi¯cant. The contribution of global shocks (corresponding to14
a complete set of year dummies) to an explanation of variance is much greater, at
4.4 per cent. However, this statistic is insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero, suggesting
that this sample of mostly poor countries is not very well integrated into the world
economy. are both important and are to some extent shared across the consump-
tion distribution. This point receives further reinforcement when we add a complete
set of country-year e®ects. These country-year e®ects account for a very signi¯cant
36 per cent of the total observed variation in consumption expenditures. The com-
bined variation explained by quintile e®ects, global shocks, and country-level shocks
amounts to 36.5 per cent. This leaves only a maximum of 63.5 per cent of variation
in consumption growth which can be peculiar to within-country factors.
The ¯nal row of Table 3 reports the amount of variation explained by world quintile-
year e®ects, or what we've termed \globalization shocks." By themselves these latent
variables account for 11 per cent of the total variation in consumption growth. How-
ever, after controlling for country-shocks, these variables account for only a further 6
per cent of the variation in growth, an amount not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
We next turn our attention to a consideration of the risk associated with the changes
in consumption which we've tried to predict with the regressions reported above.
Table 4 decomposes the total average risk borne by di®erent country-quintiles into four
pieces. With our preference parameter ° = 2 the ¯gures reported in Table 4 can be
interpreted not only as (100 times) the loss of utility associated with di®erent sources
of risk, but also as the percentage of expected consumption which households would
be willing to sacri¯ce in exchange for elimination of that source of risk. Measured
this way, the welfare loss for each of the quintiles ranges from 2.6 to 18.8 per cent|
that is, that if all risk could be eliminated so that consumption expenditures grew at
a constant rate equal to the ¯gures reported in Table 2, then households across all
these quintiles would be willing to sacri¯ce these proportions of all current and future
consumption.15
Consistent with the evidence in Table 2, we see in the present table that the e®ect
of global shocks on risk is quite small. Much more important is country-speci¯c risk.
However, the variation in consumption expenditures explained by country-speci¯c
factors turns out to be negatively correlated with other kinds of shocks. We interpret
this as evidence that in fact country-level shocks provide some measure of insurance
against the other kinds of shocks households experience. The value of this insurance
varies considerably across quintiles, with the poorest quintiles bene¯tting most (av-
erage value equal to 4.3 per cent of consumption), and the wealthiest least (average
value equal to 2.6 per cent of consumption).
Globalization risk associated with common shocks to quintiles across countries (af-
ter controlling for country level shocks) is very small, with only the poorest quintile
bearing any risk greater than 1 per cent. Thus, while there's some slight evidence
that a small share of the shocks borne by poor households are shared across coun-
tries, beyond this there's no evidence that any given quintile has integrated into the
world economy to any great extent, since neither global shocks (common to all quin-
tiles across countries) nor globalization shocks (common to particular quintiles across
quintiles) seem to explain much variation in either the rate of growth in consumption
or in the risk borne by quintiles in di®erent countries.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we've sought to account for variation in the consumption growth
experienced by households in di®erent parts of the consumption distribution across
countries and time, and then to estimate the welfare loss associated with di®erent
sources of shocks.
We construct a (unbalanced) panel of countries for which data on the distribution
of consumption expenditures is available. We ¯nd, ¯rst, that the poorest country-
quintile has an expected rate of consumption growth which is considerably greater
than that of the top twenty per cent. However, while signi¯cant, these constant
growth trends account for only a very small proportion of observed variation in growth16
rates across quintiles. More variation (roughly one twentienth) is explained by global
shocks. Over a third is explained by country-speci¯c shocks, which a®ect all quintiles
within that country more or less equally. Only 6 per cent of the remaining varia-
tion is accounted for by factors which are common to all households within a given
global consumption quantile. We regard this as evidence against the hypothesis that
the forces of globalization have had an important e®ect on global inequality, even
conditioning on changes in inequality across countries.
We exploit these results to predict levels of consumption for di®erent country-
quintiles, and follow Ligon and Schechter (2003) in exploiting these predictions to
estimate the risk borne by households within a country-quantile. We ¯nd that the
total risk is large, with households willing to sacri¯ce on average 8.4 per cent of their
expected consumption in exchange for eliminating all risk. Interestingly, country-
quintile speci¯c risk (which also will include measurement error) turns out to be
negatively related to country-level shocks; one can interpret this as evidence that
country-level shocks actually provide some measure of insurance against other kinds
of risk.
We close the paper with an important caveat. The estimates reported here are
no better than the data used as inputs. The WIID project which compiles data
on inequality should be commended for making systematic empirical research on
inequality possible, but the data available on the distribution of consumption within
countries is still sadly incomplete. Small changes in the data provided in the WIID
or changes in e.g., decisions about whether to weight observations by population can
have dramatic e®ects on results. Through the e®orts of WIID and others we've come
a long way since the days in which one had to rely on an incomplete cross-section
of countries to draw inferences about changes in inequality over time (e.g., Kuznets,
1955), but attempting to treat the available data on country-level inequality as a
representative panel as we've done here, is certainly bold and possibly foolhardy.
Hopefully this is a problem that the passage of time will likely solve.17
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Notes
1It's worth noting that in this complete markets setup consumption growth and
inequality will be simultaneously determined even when utilities aren't Gorman-
aggregable as assumed here, providing an additional theoretical rationale for the
empirical exercise of Lundberg and Squire (2003), who argue that treating growth
and inequality independently may be misleading.
2See e.g., Cochrane (1991), Townsend (1994), and Grimard (1997) for tests which
rely on household level data, and Obstfeld (1994) for tests of country-level aggregates.
3This leaves open the issue of how quintile membership may change under alterna-
tive hypotheses. If any household's position within the wealth distribution can change
then the estimates of total risk we provide later will tend to be biased downward.
4Within the economics literature, the most common measure of `globalization' is
some measure of trade openness. For con°icting claims among economists, contrast
(Dollar and Kraay, 2002) with (Lundberg and Squire, 2003) or (Milanovic, 2004).
5Note that these are measures of risk borne by households which implicitly take
into account any behavioral response households may have adopted in order to deal
with anticipated shocks. It may be, for example, that poorer households engage in
precautionary savings to a greater extent than do wealthier households; this would
have the e®ect of increasing measured inequality relative to what would be observed
in the absence of this behavioral response. Our measure of risk remains (estimation
issues aside) the correct measure of the welfare cost of any uncertainty in any given
period remaining after any such adjustments made by the household.
6The measure of risk described in Section 2.4 is, in principle, a measure of risk in
any given period. However, in estimating risk we're relying on time-series variation,
so that we instead estimate the risk in the average period.Notes 20
7In principle one could construct a test of the hypothesis of di®erence stationarity,
but we're unaware of a suitable test one could use with a (short) unbalanced panel.
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Table 3. Analysis of Variance of Consumption GrowthTables 29
Sources of Risk, Averaged over Country-Quintiles
Quintile Global + Country + Globalization + Quintile Risk = Total
20% ¡0:549 ¡4:291 1:211 22:454 18:825
40% 0:220 ¡2:283 ¡0:013 11:618 9:541
60% 0:297 ¡1:156 ¡0:046 7:553 6:648
80% 0:310 ¡0:603 ¡0:057 5:012 4:663
100% 0:235 ¡0:258 ¡0:066 2:676 2:587
Table 4. Decomposition of Risk Across Country-Quintiles